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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL LICENSE OR NATIONAL INCORPORATION
THE

message of President Roosevelt and the Report of Mr.

IGarfield as Commissioner of Corporations, if we are not mistaken, have done, or will do, more than all the discussion of the
past several years to clear the vision of the people as to what is
necessary and possible to do in the way of meeting and overcoming
our industrial and commercial corporation difficulties.
The President with characteristic vigor says: "When we come
to deal with great corporations the need for the government to act
directly is far greater than in the case of labor, because great corporations can become such only by engaging in interstate commerce,
and interstate commerce is peculiarly the field of the general government. It is an absurdity to expect to eliminate the abuses in
great corporations by state action. * * * The National government alone can deal adequately with these great corporations.
*

* *

Great corporations are necessary.

*

*

*

But these

corporations should be managed with due regard to the interests of
the public as a whole."
Mr. Garfield after stating concisely the work of the Bureau of
Corporations for the year, says: "Under present industrial conditions; secrecy and dishonesty in promotion, over-capitaliza-tion,
unfair and predatory competition, secrecy of corporate administration, and misleading or dishonest financial statements are generally
recognized as the principal evils. * * * The immediate work
is, hence, not to prove the existence and difficulties, but to find possible remedies for them. * * * The concentration of business
that has resulted from the use of the corporate form has produced
entities that are almost equal in power to the state itself; that can
meet the state on equal terms and influence it accordingly."
Remedies, he says, must be provided to protect: "(a) rights in
corporations held by those now unable to protect themselves by
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reason of lack of information or power; (b) those dealing with
corporations as employees, creditors, or consumers; (c) the public
from the abuse of great economic power coupled with little personal
responsibility; (d) the government itself from the pressure of great
commercial and financial powers directed upon it for the attainment
of purely private ends."
"The present situation of corporation law may be summed up
roughly by saying that its diversity is such that in operation it
amounts to anarchy. * * * As to the vast majority of business
done, the corporation doing it is a foreign corporation. * * *
The net result of this state system is thoroughly vicious." As to
the Federal power the Report says: "It may be considered as
established that Congress may: (i) Create corporations as a means
of regulating interstate commerce. (2) Give to such corporations
the power to engage in interstate or foreign commerce. (3) Prohibit any other corporations or individuals from engaging in the
same. (4) As a condition precedent to the grant of such corporate
powers, lay any restrictions it chooses upon the organization, conduct, or management of such corporations. (5) Tax interstate
commerce at will and the instrumentalities and corporations engaged
therein. (6) Provide regulations for carrying on of interstate
commerce generally and in such local affairs as are left to the states
in the 'silence of Congress,' and may use any and all means 'which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.'"
The Report says there are two practical methods of regulation,by Federal license, or by Federal incorporation; Mr. Garfield favors
the former, but he states what he considers the principal features
of, advantages of, and objections to, each, these jnay be thus summarized:
Federal License:
Federal Incorporation:
(a) The granting of a Fed(a) The creation by Congress
eral license to engage in inter- of corporations with power to
state commerce, imposing all engage in interstate commerce.
necessary requirements as to corporate organization, management, and report, as a condition
precedent, and fixing the conditions under which their business should be done, with the
right to refuse or withdraw such
license in case of violation of
law.
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(b) The prohibition of all
corporations
and
corporate
agencies from engaging in interstate commerce without such
Federal license.
(c) The full protection of the
grantees of such license who
obey the laws applicable thereto.

(b) The prohibition upon all
other corporations from engaging in such commerce.

(c) The granting to such
Federal corporations the right
to manufacture and produce
within the several states.

Advantages:
(a) No fundamental legal difficulty.
(b) Preservation of state incorporation fees.
(c) Preservation of state corporate taxation.

(a) Clean-cut legal theory.
(b) Entire matter under one
jurisdiction.
(c) Reduces to a minimum
the friction between Federal and
state authorities.

Several other advantages of the license plan are enumerated as
follows: sufficiency of Federal control; legal nationalization of
business that has become commercially national; the inducement. to
comply arising from stability and uniformity. Obviously all of
these would be much more pronounced and emphatic under Federal
incorporation. In fact it is difficult to see how there can be much
uniformity or stability in a license plan the substratum of which is
the conflicting and changing corporation laws of the forty-five
states; even where state laws are worded precisely the same, their
legal effect is frequently very different under the decisions of the
courts.
Objections:
(a) Foundation in state charters, and therefore the operations of the Federal law would
be confined within the varying
limits of the state incorporation
laws.
(b) Division of responsibility
for corporate control between
the Federal and state governments.

(a) Legal uncertainty as to
the Federal franchise to produce.

(b) The drastic nature of
compulsory Federal incorporation.
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(c) Centralization of forces
in corporate matters, and transferring the pressure now on
state legislatures to Congress.
(d) Placing considerable discretionary power in the hands
of a Bureau charged with the
enforcement of the law.

(c) Intense opposition to placing Federal corporations irf entire control of the most important part of commerce.
(d) Reduction of state revenue from incorporation fees.
(e) Interference with states'
power of taxation over corporations.
(f) Tremendous
centralization such a system would produce,-this is the weightiest objection.

And as objections to both there are stated: possibility of evasion;
interference with the current of trade during the period of transition; defining interstate commerce; numerous difficulties of details
in the administration of the law. As to these, it may be fairly suggested that Federal incorporation being simpler than Federal license,
the balance would probably be in favor of the incorporation plan.
It seems an ungenerous task to criticise a document which shows
in every part of it such careful study, such conscientious consideration, such fairness of statepient, such strength of argument, and
with so much of which we agree, as does this Report; it, however,
concludes in favor of Federal license, while we favor Federal incorporation, and for this reason we venture to point out wherein we
believe the Report is defective or the argument incorrect. In order
to get a fair idea of the comparative value of the two plans, it is
necessary to ascertain whether all our difficulties have been noted,
and, if possible, the relative weights of the various advantages and
objections.
It will be noticed that, if the foregoing enumeration of advantages and objections is correct, the advantages of Federal incorporation are of a most positive and substantial kind, if legal, as compared with the incidental character of those of the license plan; that
the advantages of the incorporation plan obviate all the objections,
except (c), of the license plan; that the advantages (b) and (c) of
the license plan are objections (d) and (e) of the incorporation
plan; that objection (c) to the license plan, and (c) and (f) of the
incorporation plan are of the same general nature; from this, it
would seem that the balance is strongly in favor of the incorporation plan,--its advantages being superior to, and obviating the
difficulties of, the license plan,-uness objections (a), (b), and (f)
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are vastly greater than exist in the license plan; and further, if the
enumerated advantages of the license plan can be shown to be
unreal, or incorrect, and objections (c) and (d) to the same plan to
be as serious as objections (b), (c) and (f) of the incorporation
plan, the balance is still greater in favor of incorporation; and again,
if the license plan fails to meet one of our most troublesome difficulties, or meets it only in a cumbersome, uncertain, and inadequate
way, while the incorporation plan can meet it in a simple and
direct way, the balance is still more in favor of the incorporation
plan; and further if we can show the incorporation plan is in direct
accord with our theory of government, and the license plan contrary
thereto, then still greater is the reason in favor of the incorporation
plan. We hope to show all these, but for convenience the following order will be observed: (i) Preliminary presumption; (2)
Legal defect in the license plan; (3) Incorporation fees and corporation taxation; (4) Legal uncertainty of the incorporation plan;
(5) Federal franchise to produce; (6) Drastic and centralizing
character of compulsory Federal incorporation; (7) Policy.
i. To start with, Mr. Justice Bradley has said that: "The power
of Congress is supreme over the whole subject [interstate and
foreign commerce], unembarrassed by state lines or state laws; in
this matter the country is one, and the work to be accomplished is
national; state interests, state jealousies and state prejudices do not
need to be consulted."' This was said in a case where it was
necessary to decide the point. If this is correct, and we do not
understand it has ever since been denied, then prima facie it seems
impossible to deny that, for business that has become national in
fact, it is better for the- business itself, for its management, for its
control, for the investor, for the creditor, and for the public generally, to make these subject to simple, uniform, adequate, efficient,
direct national regulation, than to leave them even partially to the
"diversity that amounts to anarchy." This is so manifest that unless
some other equally, or sufficiently, effective plan can be devised,-or
unless there is some overwhelming weight of reason or policy against
it, it should be adopted. The Report admits that the license plan
would not be equally effective, for dual responsibility is always
inefficient. Mr. Garfield, however, believes the license plan would
be sufficiently effective, and he says there is no fundamental legal
objection to it. This brings us tp:
2. Legal defect in the license plan. We believe this plan would
be inefficient, if not wholly abortive, because of fundamental legal
defects. In the enumeration above of the admitted evils, nothing is
1

Stockton v. R. R. Co.,

32

Fed. R. 9, 17.
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said of the unrestricted evil of the holding company, and the interholding of corporate shares,-and yet everybody knows our most
dangerous combinations are built up in this way,--the Sugar trust,
the Coal trust, the U. S. Steel Corporation, the Northern Securities
Co.,--are all of this character,-and their ways are more inscrutable than those of Providence, yet all are based upon state charter
provisions authorizing them. Any plan that does not reach these
is a worthless remedy. The license plan, since this subject is not
mentioned, apparently proposes to let it alone. If the license plan
were adopted it must either allow the holding of shares as now, or
forbid it. If the license so allows, then we are left in our present
predicament, and further it is proposed by the license to give protection and legality, instead of comity, to this New Jersey policy in
each of the other states, nolens volens, or to speak more correctly,
to make legal the conglomerate corporate policy of all the other
states in this respect, in each particular state. If the license forbids
the interholdings of shares, then either, (i) it makes such corporations so constituted illegal until they give up their shares, or (2)
allows them to operate under a license forbidding, and a charter
authorizing, such holding of shares, or (3) repeals the state law
pro tanto, or (4) requires the state law to be amended, or (5)
requires the corporation to reorganize under some other state law.
Here are more undecided and uncertain legal questions than can be
disposed of in a generation, and they are of such a character as
would have to be disposed of. It is impossible to know what the
legal result would be; but as to (2) any attempt to comply with a
Federal license, and an existing New Jersey charter, would fail as
completely as did the historic attempt to serve two other masters,
of whom we read. And in any one of the cases, except (2) perhaps, such prohibition under the license plan would be as drastic
as the same would be under the incorporation plan, and in addition
would raise all these legal questions; and further it would stop
present business methods, make them illegal, and provide no law
for reorganization. The incorporation plan would stop the business but provide a law under which to reorganize,-one not based
on state idiosyncrasies, but rather one as a part of a complete system
to meet the whole situation. The preliminary legal question,whether the Federal government could forbid corporations holding
shares in, or whose shares are held by, other corporations from
engaging in interstate commerce,-is the same in both; if settled in
the affirmative, in the incorporation plan the field would be left
clear of further legal difficulties, but in the license plan it would
lead directly into the legal labyrinth above noted. And further the
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same difficulties would arise as to any other point of corporate
organization or policy; hundreds of legal questions would arise in
each state, and forty-five times as many in all the states,-the license
plan instead of avoiding legal difficulties leads directly into those of
a most fundamental, unusual, unforseeable kind, that have never
yet to any extent been discussed or considered. And still further
the avenues of escape from effective regulation, the labor of administration, the litigation, the uncertainty, the official discretion, the
probability and necessity of variation in the licenses due to different
laws, with all the pressure, legitimate and otherwise, necessary to
secure such variation, would be correspondingly increased. The
legal defects and difficulties inherent in the license plan seem to us
so great as to forbid its adoption except as a last resort.
3. As to incorporation fees, it must be admitted that, like Othello's,
New Jersey's occupation would be gone, not beciuse that state
would be deprived of any right to grant interstate commerce charters, but because the offensive character of its charters would be
confined to its own territory; any effective license plan would have
to prevent the trickery possible and usual under New Jersey laws, or
similar ones, and would, therefore, have the same effect on the
incorporation fees of states having such laws; the bidding by states
for the privilege "of creating on easy terms corporations which are
never operated within the state creating, them," is one of the evils
to be stopped, and doing so is not a valid objection to either the
license or incorporation plan; and if not done by the license plan, we
should considei that a defect. The Federal charter would undoubtedly be preferable, and therefore not so many state charters would
be granted, and the fees would fall off. The license plan proposes
to grant and enforce valuable Federal privileges to state corporations for a mere pittance,--a continuation of the same vicious policy
of granting valuable special privileges without pay, that has so long
characterized the grant of state and municipal franchises. We submit that common sense, past experience, good business, and the
public welfare all require that the Federal government should not
give away, but should charge a fair fee for, its valuable Franchises.
Further there is no more reason to object to a Federal incorporation law, because it shifts fees from the states to the Federal government, than there is to object to a National bankrupt law, because it
displaces the fees arising from state insolvent laws. All the fees
come from the people, and the essential point is not to which government they go, but which can give the best service for the least
money.
As to taxation, the license plan proposes to leave things as they
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now are,-subject to all the inequalities and absurdities of state
taxation. Iowa taxes its own insurance companies one per cent on
their premiums; corporations of sister states it taxes two per cent,
and foreign corporations three and one-half per cent.2 This is
a sample of the policy of the states; no greater, more vexatious,
or more unjust burden can be placed upon the interstate business of the country than is put upon it by the state laws taxing
foreign corporations, and it seems to be legally possible for each
state, in the form of a license fee, to tax such corporations upon the
face value of their whole capital stock.3 There is, or need be, no
serious difficulty in providing a just system of taxation of Federal
corporations. While the matter is within the Federal control, yet a
slight modification of the method of taxing National banks or the
Pacific railroads,-the states to tax.the tangible real and personal
property within their borders, and the Federal government to tax
the Federal corporate franchise, the shares to be exempt,-would
be just, easily provided for and enforced. A Federal incorporation
law, fair and equitable on the subject would be a boon to the business of the country. If then, what has been said is correct, the
special enumerated advantages of, become objections to, the license
plan.
4. The first enumerated objection to the Federal incorporation
plan is stated to be the legal uncertainty of the Federal franchise to
produce. The validity of this objection depends on (a) the necessity of such a franchise, and (b) the degree of the legal uncertainty.
As to (a) the Report takes the view that in order to regulate
commerce, Federal corporations would require the power to produce
within the states. We do not admit that there is any legal or actual
necessity for such power, or that interstate commerce could not be
effectively controlled without it. Federal commercial corporations
would be created either to transport persons or things, to transmit
intelligence, or to trade, or all thre6 of these, across state lines, for
these are strictly commercial powers. There is certainly no legal
necessity that a corporation with any or all of these powers should
engage in the production, of the things transported or bought and
sold. A power to regulate commerce by incorporating a company
to carry passengers from state to state would not include the right to
breed and raise the passengers. The power to produce legally
includes the power to sell the product, because the product becomes
property, which includes the right to own, use, and dispose of it; but
the right to haul property has no legal connection with the right to
2'Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 Fed. R. 7M1.
3 People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 1o5 N. Y. 76, 143 U. S. 305.
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produce; neither has the right to buy, nor the right to sell. All
these rights take for granted that the property already exists to be
hauled, bought, or sold. The most that can fairly be said is that it
would often be convenient for one who has the right to haul, buy or
sell things to have the additional power to produce them,-but there
is no legal necessity therefor.
Neither is there an actual necessity, unless we are mistaken, in
order to regulate commerce, although we readily grant that in many
cases such power might be both legally and economically convenient.
However, it has been cogently, and we believe, correctly argued that
many of the producing interests are now so connected through
'community of interest' with the transportation agencies as to make
it practically impossible to prevent railroad discriminations without
rigidly divorcing them; and if the interstate trading interests were
entirely divorced from the producing and transporting interests,
most of our serious predatory competition and monopolistic combinations would be destroyed or harmless. If each of the sugar
manufacturing plants of the American Sugar Refining Company
could be prevented from selling across state lines to any one except
Federal buying and selling companies entirely unconnected with the
producing companies, and subject to strict Federal control, it would
be possible to remodel Mr. Havemeyer's 'devil take the hindmost'
monopoly.
As to (b) ,-the degree of legal uncertainty. This is only that .no
case has yet been decided. We believe that the Federal government
can give capacity (but not a legally enforceable right in the states
without their consent) to produce within the states with their consent.- While no case has so held so far as we know, yet the Pacific
railroads are permitted to haul intra-state, as well as inter-state
freight; the National banks are allowed to do a local loan and discount business, and in Osborn v. United States Bank,4 after full
argument Chief Justice Marshall held that possession of similar
powers did not prevent the United States Bank from being a public
governmental institution, nor make it a purely private business corporation; but further it has been, and is, .the universal practice of
the states to give capacitiesto be exercised in other states, but which
can be so exercised only with such states' consent. This matter is
more fully developed below.
Mr. Garfield, however, as to this point after extended argument,
concludes that the Federal government can confer upon its own corporations not merely the corporate capacity to produce in the states
with their consent, but the full legal right to do so without their
Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.
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consent. We think he is mistaken as to this, and we consider the
matter further below. But in any event if either view is correct, the
legal uncertainty of the incorporation plan is not a formidable
objection.
5. We have just stated the conclusion of the Report as to the
Federal franchise to produce, and how we differ from the view
taken. Inasmuch as the conclusion of the Report and the argument
supporting it-make the Federal incorporation plan appear to be
much more drastic and centralizing than we think it really is, it is
necessary 'to examine the matter in detail; we will first state the
argument of the Report; then our objections to it; and then try to
show that if the argument of the Report is correct, the license plan
is more drastic and offensively centralizing than the incorporation
plan.
The argument is: Congress can give an interstate commerce
corporation the right (not merely capacity) to produce within the
states, in order to regulate interstate commerce because such power
is (i) an appropriate incidental, and (2) an absolutely essential,
means of properly regulating such commerce. As to (I), Chief
Justice Marshall is quoted, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution
are constitutional," and it is then said: (a) because the regulation of
interstate commerce is the legitimate .and constitutional end, the
means, that is, the power to produce, comes clearly within all the
other specifications; further, (b) a Federal trading corporation
chartered as a means of regulating interstate commerce, would be
given the power to buy and sell the subjects of commerce; it is a
naturaland utsual power of a corporation that sells, also to produce
the thing sold,-a separation of these powers would be unusual and
inexpedient; hence, the power to produce is an appropriate incidental to the power to sell. We have already touched upon this
matter above, and do not agree with either (a) or (b). As to (a),
would any one say that the power to lay taxes to pay debts would
include-the power to produce things to be taxed? Yet there would
be a legitimate and constitutional end, and the means,-making
something to be taxed,-would be as appropriate and necessary as,
and no more prohibited than, in the other case. By this method of
reasoning the power to produce could be derived as incidental to
nearly any one of the enumerated powers of Congress. Again as
to (b) the power to sell, usually accompanies the power to produce,
and very properly so, but strictly as an incidental right of owner-
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ship; so, too, while a corporation, organized to buy and sell, is often,
though by no means always, given the power to produce the thing
bought or sold, yet I know of no decision to the effect that a charter
power to a corporation to carry on a wholesale grocery business,
would carry as incidental thereto a power to buy a farm and raise
potatoes to be sold; neither would a corporation organized to buy
and sell dry goods, have as incident to such power, the additional
power to raise sheep and cotton, and manufacture the dry goods it
sells; every rule of interpretation is the other way; a power to make
things, includes as incidental thereto the power to sell them, but not
the general power of buying and selling as a business; and still less
does the power to buy and sell, include the power to produce.
But further as to (2) it is argued: (a) Congress can create a corporation with power to carry on interstate commerce; (b) it must
therefore, be able to give such corporation power to produce the
subjects of commerce, otherwise the first power would be useless;
for let it be assumed: (c) that such a corporation is created; (d)
that the states can and do prohibit it from producing within the
states; (e) that the states do prohibit all domestic producers from
selling to such corporation; (f) that, in retaliation, the Federal
government prohibits all state corporations from carrying on interstate commerce; then there would be a deadlock, and neither government could regulate commerce; but Congress has the power to
do so; therefore the state's power must yield, and Congress must
have the power to confer the right to produce in a state without the
states' consent,-that is, supposition (d) is invalid. We believe
there are errors in (a), (b) and (e), which invalidate the whole
argument. Congress is given the power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce, and the ordinary sense of such words is that such
power exists if there is any such commerce to regulate; if not, there
is nothing to regulate, and no need of regulation. The term used
in (a) -is 'carry on,' and in (b) this is used in the sense of giving the
'right to continue to carry it on,'-even though there is nothing produced by any one else to be the subject of such commerce. We do
not think 'to carry' freight would include 'to make' the freight to be
carried: 'to regulate' a thing presupposes the thing to exist, and does
not include bringing the thing into existence in order to regulate it;
Congress has power 'to regulate,' and if 'to regulate' includes 'to
produce in order to regulate,' then Congress can regulate sowing
and reaping, seed time and harvest, marrying and giving in marriage, because they are all connected with producing the subjects of
interstate commerce. So we think (a) and (b) are incorrect.
Again, the chain of reasoning from (c) on, can be no stronger
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than its weakest link, and the whole matter depends on the validity
of (e) ; for if a Federal corporation can purchase anywhere the subjects of commerce, then the power to produce is not absolutely essential to the power to carry on interstate commerce. The Report
anticipates this, and says: (g) "The power to purchase from state
producers stands in the same legal relation to the power of the state
as does the proposed power to produce. The transaction of purchase and sale between a state vendor and an interstate commerce
corporation purchaser is purely a domestic transaction,"-and therefore, if the power to produce can be forbidden, the power to purchase can also, and the deadlock again results; but the power to
purchase cannot be forbidden, hence the power to produce cannot.
We believe (e) is invalid, (I) because, such Federal corporation
could purchase abroad instead of within any state, and (2) because
the reasoning in (g) is unsound.
Chief Justice Fuller in the Knight case,5 stated what has always
been the doctrine of the Supreme Court, "Contracts to buy, sell or
exchange goods to be transported among the several states, the
transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold, or
exchanged for the purpose of such transit among the states, or put
in the way of'transit, may be regulated, because they form part of
interstate trade or commerce." It is difficult to see why a purchase
by Federal corporation A, located in State X, of goods of B, located
in State Y, to be sent to A in State X is not a transaction of interstate commerce. Every sale is either domestic, interstate, or foreign, commerce; if it is one, it is neither of the others; if it is
domestic, it is not interstate, or vice versa. But unless the foregoing
is an interstate transaction, there can be none. The only reason
given in the Report that such is a purely domestic transaction, is
that the article purchased "might be used in domestic commerce,"
and, according to the Knight case, it is said neither the intent to use
nor the probability that an article will be used in interstate commerce makes it the subject of such commerce. This was said about
inaking, not selling, sugar, and the court held that making sugar in
one state, intending to sell it when made in other states did not
make the making of it, commerce; and Chief Justice Fuller used the
language quoted above to show that 'commerce' did not include
'mianufacture.'
The only other reason, perhaps implied, but not explicitly relied
on in the Report, why a sale across state lines to a Federal corporation would not be interstate commerce, is that such corporation "is
not a foreign corporation as to the soil of any state nor does its
rU. S. V. E. C. Kniglt Co., 156 U. S. 1, 13, 36.
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status there depend upon the comity of states"; while this may be
true (so far as there is an attempt by a state to tax it as a foreign
corporation) 6 a Federal corporation has a local habitation or place
of business in some state, just as much as if incorporated in that
state, and its purchases from, and sales to, persons in other states,
of goods to be sent across state lines are not domestic, but interstate, transactions, just as a bill of exchange by a national bank in
one state upon a' national bank in another state to be paid there is
not an inland, but an interstate bill of exchange.
But further, we live under a dual government. We have privileges and immunities as citizens of the several states, and privileges
and immunities as citizens of the United States; our right to make
things within a state is a civil right held under state laws; so is our
right to engage in domestic commerce; these are beyond Federal,
and exclusively within state, control, except so far as protected by
the 'due process,' and 'equal protection' clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. The right to travel from state to state, or to engage in
interstate or foreign commerce, is a right privilege or immunity as a
citizen of the United States, held under the Federal constitution and
laws, and which "no state shall pass any law to abridge." Neither
state nor Federal corporations merely as such are citizens within
this provision, and the government that creates the corporation
could, at its creation, undoubtedly prohibit it from engaging in
either domestic, interstate or foreign commerce. No state, however,
could forbid a Federal corporation, with the charter power, nor a
corporation of another state with charter power and a Federal
license, to engage in interstate commerce because the subject matter is outside state control; neither could a state forbid its citizen
from an interstate buying or selling to such corporations because his
right to do either is his right as a citizen of the United States; but
any state could forbid any alien, or any corporation, Federal or
state, to which it had not granted the power, to produce within thz
state, because such have no rights as citizens of the United States.7
The same is true as to its own citizens within the states,-their right
to produce is a right as a citizen of the state, and can be prohibited,
if at all, only by the state.wherein the attempt is made; the state's
right to prohibit,however, is greatly limited by the provisions of the
I4th amendment that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
Commonwealth v. Texas & P. R. R. Co., 98 Pa. St. go.
7 There perhaps would be an exception to this in case a corporation was 'chartered by

the Federal government strictly to manufacture supplies for the government, as armor
plate, ammunition, &c.
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. One's rights
as a Federal citizen cannot be abridged by the states, nor can his
rights as a state citizen be abridged by the Federal government.
We understand these to be the settled d6ctrines of the Supreme
8
Court ever since the Slaughter House and Civil Rights cases.
If the foregoing is correct, then there is no incidental power
under the 'commerce clause,' for the Federal government to give
by charter to its own corporation, or by license to a state corporation the general right to produce within a state without that state's
consent, although there is a clear authority to give such a right to
either a Federal or state corporation to carry on interstate and foreign commerce,--i. e., buy and sell across state lines,-without any
state's consent. If this is true then there is no legal necessity of a
Federal corporation having the right to produce the subjects of commerce within a state without its consent in order to prevent a
deadlock.
While we hold that the Federal government under its power to
regulate commerce can not give its own corporation, or one of any
state, the legal right to produce within any state without its consent,
yet we believe the Federal government can give to its own corporation the corporate capacity to produce, if the state where production is undertaken does not object. This is not because it has any
direct jurisdiction over production as such, but because it has
authority to mould its own corporation as it pleases. This has been
the universally accepted corporate doctrine and practice. No state
can give its corporation a right to produce in any other state; it can
only give it capacity to do so in any state that does not object. The
reasons are: Every corporation, as such, is subject to the control
of the government creating it; the business it does is subject to the
control of the government having jurisdiction over the business
done. Each state has exclusive jurisdiction over the production
within its borders, by whomsoever done; the Federal government
has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce, by whomsoever
done. Any state can create a producing corporation, and prescribe
the terms upon which it will allow it to engage in interstate commerce,--not because it has any jurisdiction over such commerce, but
because it has complete authority over its own corporation; to allow,
or to forbid it to engage in such commerce is not regulating commerce in the legal sense, and such permission is subject to the paramount authority of the Federal government to regulate such commerce. On the other hand the Federal government may create a
ISlaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485; Civil Rights
Cases, xog U. S. 3; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S.
137, 15-
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corporation to engage in interstate commerce, and may prescribe the
terms upon which it will allow such corporations to produce within
the states; it may forbid or allow this, not because it has any jurisdiction over production within the states, but because it has juris-

diction over its own corporation as such; to forbid or to allow it to
engage in production is not regulating production within the states,
-that is still subject to the paramount control of the state where
done. The control of the producing corporation that engages in
interstate commerce, by the state creating it, is not directly, but only
incidentally controlling such commerce; so the control of a trading
corporation that produces within the states, by the Federal government that creates it, is not directly, but only incidentally, controlling
production within the states. The former does not violate Federal
power, and the latter does not infringe state authority. Even if the
Federal government should forbid state producing corporations
from erigaging in interstate commerce, and all the states should forbid Federal trading corporations from producing within the states,
there could be no deadlock, for under the 'due process' constitutional
provision, neither the state nor Federal governments can wholly prevent individual production and domestic commerce in the states; and
if A and B in state X can buy of, and sell to, one another, C in state
Y has the same right to buy of or sell to either A or B in state X,
because the citizens of one state are entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states; and if such a transaction
took the form of interstate commerce it would, for that reason, be
beyond state control. The only peculiar result would be that the
products of state corporations would have to be sold to individuals
within the states, or directly to Federal trading corporations. Of
course there is no likelihood of such an absurd legal situation, as all,
or any great number, of the states, undertaking to control Federal
trading corporations in this way, although something of the kind did
occur in I816-'2o as to the Second United States bank. There is no
direct legal authority upon the theory here advanced, but what incidental consideration it has received points to the conclusion we have
given.9
6. Drastic and centralizing character of compulsory Federal
incorporation. We have entered into the foregoing extremely technical legal discussion, in order to clear up as well as we could, what
we think are mistaken ideas concerning the drastic and centralizing
character of Federal incorporation. So far as we have observed
the supposed drastic and centralizing tendencies of the Federal
9 Reagan v. Mercantile & T. Co., 154 U. S. 413; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. California,
16: U. S. 91; Smythe v. Ames, x69 U. S. 466, 516-22.
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incorporation plan have been stated to be: (a) Prohibition of state
corporations from engaging in interstate commerce without reorganizing under the Federal law,-we have already considered this
and concluded the license plan, to be efficient, would be even more
drastic; (b) shifting of incorporation fees and taxes, which we
have also considered; (c) shifting litigation from state to Federal
courts,-this we have also mentioned as likely to be worse under the
license plan; and (d) finally, bringing all production under direct
Federal control. We ha' e just considered this and concluded that
the Federal incorporation plan, rightly considered, contemplates
nothing of the kind, but on the other hand strictly preserves the
power of the states over such matters, and is only designed to prevent the arrogant overriding of the just powers of the states by
force, fraud, evasion, bribery and other devious ways through intricate combinations impossible to unravel-though legal by the law of
some state.
If, however, our view is incorrect, and the view taken in the
Report is correct, and the Federal government has the power to give
the right to its own or to a state corporation to produce within a
state without its consent, and this is done, then there is undoubtedly
centralization, so it is necessary to consider what would be the effect
under the license plan also. If the power to regulate commerce
among the states includes the power to regulate productioln, directly,
within the states the result would be, as said by Mr. Justice Lamar
in Kidd v. Pearson,0 that "Congress would be invested, to the
exclusion of the states with the power to regulate not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic
fisheries, mining,-in short every branch of human industry.* * *
A situation more paralyzing to the state governments and less likely
to have been what the framers of the Constitution intended, it would
be difficult to imagine." This would be justly chargeable against
Federal incorporation if such a power is necessary to, and enforceable under, that plan. We have however shown that it is not necessary, and if desirable, it is subject to state control. How about the
license plan? The U. S. Steel Corporation's New Jersey Charter
authorizes it to mine, manufacture, transport, buy, sell, exchange
nearly anything anywhere; the license plan proposes to guarantee
protection to the state corporation having the Federal license, in the
exercise of all its corporate powers throughout the country, except
such as are inconsistent with the license. Nothing could be more
to the liking of these industrial combinations than to have their
present charter powers validated by a Federal license against present possible state and Federal assault. As Mr. Justice Bradley said
10128
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in Stockton v. B. &c. R. R. Co." "in the pursuit of a business
authorized by the government of the United States, the corporations
of other states cannot be prohibited or obstructed by any state."
This was said in regard to building an interstate bridge by an interstate railroad, and nothing else, and was clearly correct for such'was
an instrument of interstate commerce; if the argument in the Report
is correct,-that commerce includes production,-then the Federal
license carries the charter power of every state corporation to produce, into every other state; in other words manufacturing and producing within Michigan remains no longer subject to Michigan
laws, but becomes subject, not merely to Federal control, but also
is subjected, or may be, through the Federal power, to the manufacturing policy of New Jersey-or even New Zealand. Under
this view the license plan would be not drastic merely but an unendurable abomination. We do not believe, notwithstanding the
Report, that any such power exists in the Federal government under
either an incorporation or a license plan; hence this bugbear disappears, and the balance remains in favor of incorporation. But
even if we are mistaken, subjecting state production to one uniform
Federal law, would be preferable to subjecting it to the non-uniform
laws of the forty-five states. The first would be reasonable and
effective centralization; the latter extreme, unreasonable, unjust and
inefficient centralization.
Wherein is the incorporation plan otherwise more centralizing?
To create a corporation is simply to give to a changing body of
persons the status of a single person in carrying on the business
designated; the main difference between it and a license is to give
complete jurisdiction over the person created, instead of merely over
the license granted.; the license plan may enable the Federal government to dehorn the bull, but leaves him yet at large with the same
instincts and capacity to invade or imperil the china shop; the Federal incorporation plan enables the government to convert the
offending animal into mincemeat or extract of beef, without delay.
7. Policy. As things now are, commerce is carried on by corporations that owe no Federal but only state allegiance; the license plan
proposes to continue this; the life of the individual who disobeys
Federal law may be taken if the law so provides,-but the life of the
state-created corporation can not be, except by the state that creates
it. We do not believe in this discrimination. Let the corporation
that carries on interstate commerce owe as direct and positive allegiance to the Federal government as the individual citizen who
engages in such commerce. This is not offensive centralization; it
"32
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is only justice and fairness; it is the "square deal" all around;
besides, it goes back to first principles,--the government that undertakes to control should operate directly on the persons, natural or
artificial, to be controlled, and only the government that has
adequate power should undertake it. Two ideas dominated the
Federal constitutional convention, viz.: that the Federal powers
should operate directly upon all persons everywhere, without consulting state laws or state prejudices, and that the government
should have adequate powers to accomplish the duties with which
it was charged. Five different times the convention resolved unanimously that Congress should be given power "to legislate in all
cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual legislation." These were the directions given and
observed in formulating the express powers of Congress; these were
the ends to be accomplished; the powers given were given to accomplish these ends. The occasion has now arisen for their application
to our commercial affairs. To apply them directly and in the
simplest way is in accord with our political principles: to give to the
township, the county, the city, the state, the Nation that power
which each can best use for the best interests of those directly
affected, and by the direct operation of the powers given, on the
things to be regulated, has been the dominant political idea of our
life from Plymouth Rock to Appomattox, if not from the Germania
of Tacitus to the American Political Ideas of John Fiske. The government under the Confederation was not constructed on this plan,and failed; the National government is so constructed. Federal
incorporation is the National stage; Federal license is the Confederation stage; the Confederation plan did not work. The National
plan will.
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